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CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S REPLY 
In it's Opposition to Claimant/Appellant's Opening Brief, 
Defendants/Respondents argue that the Commission's findings were based on 
"substantial and competent evidence," and therefore Claimant's appeal must be denied. 
[Respondent's Opposition Brief, p. 17] They argue that Claimant is asking the Court to 
"re-try the underlying case and re-weigh evidence." [Defendant's Opposition Brief, p. 22] 
Defendant's further argue that Claimant "has not argued that the Commission 
misapplied the law in this case." [Respondent's Opposition Brief, p. 22] 
Defendants argue they are entitled to attorney's fees in addition to costs on 
appeal. 
Claimant contends the Referee clearly made numerous obvious factual errors and 
the Commission clearly misapplied the law in this case, and, as a result, they came to an 
erroneous conclusion. 
"Whether the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts is an issue of law 
over which we exercise free review." Combes v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 
Idaho 430, 432, 942 P.2d 554, 556 (1997). 
REPLY ARGUMENT: 
It is worth repeating that in the Conclusion of her Opening Brief, pages 25 and 26, 
the Claimant clearly set forth her contention that the Commission misapplied the law in 
this case. 
She stated: 
"Arthur Larsen, in his treatise "The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation," states that the "by accident" requirement is now deemed 
satisfied in most jurisdictions either if the cause was of accidental 
character or if the effect was the unexpected result of the strain of 
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claimant's usual exertions.1 (emphasis added) He states therein that 
since a so-called "slipped intervertebral disc" is a herniation or rupture, 
and thus mechanically comparable to an inguinal hernia, it is not 
surprising to find that a heavy preponderance of jurisdictions, (including 
Idaho )2 afford compensation for this type of injury without exacting proof 
of unusual exertion or mishap as a cause. 
"It is a mistake of law for the Referee and the Commission in this 
case, to hold this Claimant to a standard higher than that of other, similarly 
situated Claimant's in this State, and order her to prove "unusual exertion 
or mishap as a cause" of her injury, when it is clear that she has proven 
that, whatever the cause - whether reaching, lifting, stooping, or just 
standing, clearly her back injury arose on or about November 24, 2008, 
while she was "engaged in her ordinary, usual work" as a waitress. There 
is no substantial evidence to the contrary." 
In other words, it was an error of law for the Commission to hold the Claimant to 
show "exacting proof of unusual exertion or mishap" or "some sudden or violent 
accident" preceding the injury as the cause of her injury, and focus on her several 
statements given over a period of a number of years, when there is no substantial or 
competent evidence that Claimant's injury did not occur on about November 24, 2008, 
while she was at work waitressing. The Commission and Defendants focus on the 
definition of "accident" as being some sudden or violent event at work, when in fact the 
standard they should have applied provides that the injury in Claimant's case is the 
"unexpected, undesigned, unlooked for mishap" or "accident." 
The Commission (and Defendants) have failed to afford Claimant the equal 
application of the law, and held her to a standard of proving an "unusual exertion or 
mishap," misplacing their attention to the details of the events of that day at work, when 
1 Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §38.00. 
2 Ibid. §38.22, citing Harding v. Idaho Department Store, 80 Idaho 156, 326 P.2d 992. At page 159 of this 
case, this Court stated: "It is unnecessary that the claimant be engaged in some unusual work or that there 
be a slipping, falling or some sudden or violent accident preceding the injury before it is compensable. If 
the claimant be engaged in his ordinary, usual work and the strain of such labor becomes sufficient to 
overcome the resistance of claimant's body and causes an injury, such injury is compensable." 
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the attention should have been on what was her injury and where the Claimant was when 
the injury arose, and whether or not it occurred while she was engaged in her usual and 
ordinary work. 
This correct standard was recently applied in the case of Joseph Henry v. 
Department of Corrections, et. al., Docket No. 39039-2011, Opinion No. 9, January 23, 
2013. 
In that case the Claimant suffered a heart attack shortly after arriving at work. As 
in this case, the issue was causation. Henry was not required to prove an "unusual 
exertion or mishap" or some "sudden or violent event" preceding his injury. In fact, this 
Court held that "[T]he plaque rupture certainly was "an unexpected, undesigned, and 
unlooked for mishap, or untoward event" causing injury. (emphasis added) Then the 
issue turned on whether or not the accident was one "arising out of and in the course of' 
employment. [Ibid.] Regarding that, this Court stated: 
"The issue in this case is not when the heart attack occurred. The heart 
attack is the injury, and for Mr. Henry to be entitled to compensation there 
must have been an industrial accident that caused that injury. In this case, 
the accident would have to have been the rupture of the atherosclerotic 
plaque." 
In the present case the Claimant suffered a herniated disc that is in need of 
surgery. That ruptured disc is undisputed and should have been considered the 
"industrial accident." The Claimant should not have been forced to try to recall the 
precise moment and details of some sudden, violent incident at work that caused the 
injury. She should have needed only to show it occurred while engaged in her ordinary, 
usual work for the Defendant employer - which she did. There is no substantial, 
competent evidence to the contrary. 
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In the Henry case there was only one medical expert who supplied an opinion as 
to when the plaque rupture took place. 
In this case there was not just one, but four doctors who gave expert medical 
opinions regarding whether or not this was a work-related injury/accident - Crook, 
Walker, Blair and Hajjar. As explained more fully in Claimant's Opening Brief, Dr. 
Hajjar was mislead that the Claimant initially injured herself outside of work, since the 
record is clear that the "house" is the kitchen and dish area of the restaurant. [HT p. 53, 
lines 1-11]. Further, even the Referee found Dr. Hajjar's opinion to be unpersuasive and 
lacking foundation.3 It was Dr. Justin Crook, DC's opinion that the herniated disc was "a 
direct result of the injury she sustained at work while lifting and twisting." [Claimant's 
Exhibit 2, p. 4] In his IME report Dr. Gary Walker gave his unequivocal opinion, that 
"Ms. Clark had the onset of pain complaints on November 24, 2008." [Claimant's 
Exhibit 6, p. 9] And Dr. Benjamin Blair reviewed all of the Claimant's medical records 
and interviewed the Claimant and gave his clear and unequivocal opinion that the 
herniated disc was caused by a lifting incident at work 
It is clear that the Claimant suffered a herniated disc at work on November 24, 
2008. She had no pre-existing conditions and there is no substantial or competent 
evidence that the injury/accident occurred anywhere else. The medical experts agree. 
In her Opening Brief Claimant explained why it was important to observe that 
notice was not an issue in the case and by admission the Surety had timely notice of the 
3 Findings ofFact, p. 14, par. 31. 
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work injury by December 15, 2008.4 The Claimant showed beyond any doubt it was the 
Surety, not Claimant, who completed the FROI after it was discovered the Claimant 
needed surgery. This fact is not "harmless error" since it changes the context of every 
statement Claimant made after December 15, 2008. 
When considered in light of that notice, Claimant's allegedly contradictory 
statements as well as the statements regarding her injury in her medical records, as well 
as the medical opinions of her treating physicians and the IME doctors, support the fact 
that, regardless of what she was specifically engaged in doing at the time, the Claimant 
injured her back at work waitressing on November 24, 2008. It doesn't matter whether 
she was standing, bending, reaching, lifting, falling, or stooping - the "accident" that 
occurred at work was her herniated disc and it should be considered compensable 
because it occurred in the course and scope of her employment. Both the Commission's 
and Defendants' reliance on the details of Claimant's version of an "unusual exertion or 
mishap" at work to deny her claim is misplaced, since there is no substantial or 
competent evidence that the Claimant's injury/accident occurred anywhere other than at 
work while engaged in her waitressing duties. 
As such, the Commission and Defendants' have misapplied the facts and the law, 
and the Claimant respectfully requests this Court to apply the correct facts to the correct 
law. 
Defendant's arguments that they are entitled to attorney's fees are also without 
foundation in either fact or law. 
4 See last sentence on page 8 of Defendants' Opposition Brief; See also top of page 18. The FROI was 
completed by the manager, Zach Dummermuth, and stated the employer was notified of the accident on 
December 15, 2008. Furthermore "notice" was admitted in Defendants Answer and is not an issue in this 
case. (AGENCY RECORD, p. 9) 
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Respectfully, 
Dated: {V1 Cfv\...c.~ l 9 l o I 3 
I 
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PAUL T. CURTIS 
Attorney for Claimant/ Appellant 
Dallas Clark 
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